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Mental Impairment and Mens Rea: North Carolina
Recognizes the Diminished Capacity Defense
in State v. Shank and State v. Rose
Until recently the North Carolina Supreme Court has rejected a doctrine
known as the "diminished capacity defense"' which recognizes that a person's
mental impairment might prevent him from forming the mental state that is an
essential element of a crime.2 The doctrine is cited most often in first-degree
murder cases.3 Long adopted by courts in other states4 and by federal courts, 5
the doctrine was given effect in two 1988 North Carolina Supreme Court deci-
sions, State v. Shank 6 and State v. Rose.7 Both decisions unanimously ordered
new trials for defendants convicted of first-degree murder. The Shank court
found prejudicial error in a trial judge's exclusion of expert testimony relevant to
the premeditation and deliberation elements of first degree murder.8 The deci-
sion turned on the supreme court's application of evidence rules. 9 The Rose
court found error in a trial judge's refusal to instruct jurors that they should
consider a defendant's mental condition when determining whether he commit-
ted premeditated and deliberated murder. 10 The Rose court cited Shank as au-
thority.11 Rose broadened the precedent set by Shank by holding that a
defendant may use the diminished capacity defense even where the defendant
1. This doctrine also has been referred to as "diminished responsibility" and other terms.
Eg., P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 101(a) (1984 & Supp. 1988); Note, Criminal
Law--Diminished Responsibility, Long Ignored in North Carolina, is Given a Hearing But Not Yet
Adopted, 54 N.C.L. REV. 993, 993 (1976). "Diminished capacity defense" appears to be the most
widely recognized term and is unlikely to be confused with other legal doctrines. See, eg., Sendor,
Crime as Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements
of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1430 (1986) (diminished capacity is a "negativing defense designed to
rebut prosecution evidence on an essential mental element of crime"; diminished responsibility
reduces criminal culpability for a defendant who, despite a mental abnormality, is proven guilty).
Although "diminished capacity defense" is not a very accurate term, as discussed infra at notes 67-
68 and accompanying text, this Note will use the term rather than create or borrow an unfamiliar
term.
2. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 4.7 (1986); P. ROBINSON, supra
note 1, § 64(a).
3. See cases cited in LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 4.7(b); P. ROBINSON, supra note 1,
§ 64(a) n.5. The mens rea elements of first-degree murder in North Carolina are willfulness, pre-
meditation, and deliberation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1986).
4. See cases cited in ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 64(a); Annotation, Mental or Emotional Con-
dition As Diminishing Responsibility for Crime, 22 A.L.R.3D 1228, 1239 (1968 & Supp. 1988).
5. Bowen v. Kemp, 832 F.2d 546, 550 (1lth Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, Kemp v. Dix,
108 S. Ct. 1120 (1988), Kemp v. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. 1247 (1988); Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250,
1255 (7th Cir.), cert dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1000-
01 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane). These cases are discussed infra at notes 120-139 and accompanying
text.
6. 322 N.C. 243, 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988).
7. 323 N.C. 455, 373 S.E.2d 426 (1988).
8. Shank, 322 N.C. at 249, 367 S.E.2d at 643.
9. Shank was decided pursuant to rules 401,403, 702, and 704 of the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence. Id. at 247-49, 367 S.E.2d at 642-43.
10. Rose, 323 N.C. at 457-58, 373 S.E.2d at 428.
11. Id. The court also cited as authority N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1232 (1987) which provides
for jury instructions.
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also asserts the defense of insanity. 12
Shank and Rose have opened the door for the diminished capacity defense
in North Carolina, but the width of the opening is not yet clear. The doctrine
necessarily will be limited by existing constraints such as the defendant's burden
of producing1 3 competent evidence to support any defense.14 This Note exam-
ines Shank and Rose,15 how these decisions compare with previous North Caro-
lina case law,' 6 and how they have changed the law. 17 The Note also discusses
constitutional protections invoked by the diminished capacity defense t8 and
what evidence relevant to mental condition is admissible under state and federal
evidence rules.19 The Note concludes that when a defendant's mental condition
at the time of an alleged offense is relevant to an element of the crime, he should
be allowed to introduce otherwise admissible evidence of the condition and have
the jury consider whether that evidence raises a reasonable doubt about the re-
12. Rose, 323 N.C. at 456, 373 S.E.2d at 427.
13. To obtain a jury instruction on diminished capacity the defendant must, as with other ne-
gating defenses, meet an initial burden of production. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 230-31
(1976) (Powell, J., dissenting) (even where state has burden of persuasion, defendant may have bur-
den of producing evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the issue); Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684, 701 n.28 (1975) (states may require defendant to produce some evidence to raise a
negating defense); Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778 F.2d 168, 181 (4th Cir. 1985) (Phillips, J., concurring)
(defendant asserting a defense to rebut a presumption must produce "at least a modicum of...
evidence in order to hold the state to the full burden of persuasion with which it entered trial"); see
also P. ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 64(a) (most jurisdictions place burden of production on defendant
who claims mental defect negates a mental element). The burden might be similar to that of the
intoxication defense, discussed infra at note 79 and accompanying text, or might be lower as dis-
cussed infra at note 192 and accompanying text.
14. To be admissible, evidence must comply with the rules of evidence of the appropriate juris-
diction. These rules sometimes exclude relevant evidence. For example, the North Carolina
Supreme Court in State v. Weeks, 322 N.C. 152, 167, 367 S.E.2d 895, 904 (1988), handed down the
same day as Shank, held that a psychiatrist's testimony about a murder suspect's mental state was
inadmissible under rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence because the testimony em-
braced precise legal terms not readily understood by the expert. Id. The Weeks court did not dis-
cuss whether the testimony was otherwise relevant as evidence of diminished capacity. Likewise the
court in Rose, although recognizing the diminished capacity defense, held as inadmissable under
North Carolina rule 702 a psychiatrist's testimony that defendant could not have premeditated or
deliberated. Rose, 323 N.C. at 459-60, 373 S.E.2d at 429-30 (citing Weeks and its reasoning); see
infra notes 165-78 and accompanying text for a comparison of evidentiary rulings in Weeks, Rose,
and Shank.
15. See infra notes 21-61 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 86-102 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
18. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (mechanistic application of hearsay
rules violated defendant's due process right to present evidence to refute state's accusation); Wash-
ington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (defendant's right to present witnesses to establish a defense
"is a fundamental element of due process of law"); see also Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 233-34
(1987) (if affirmative defense is rejected by jury, evidence of that defense should not be disregarded
automatically by jury in considering elements of the prosecution's case); Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197, 210 (1977) (although burden of proving affirmative defense may be shifted to defendant,
prosecution must prove every element of criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt); Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-04 (1975) (due process clause requires prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the absence of heat of passion where statute defines "malice aforethought" as an
element of murder); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (due process clause of fourteenth
amendment requires prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every element
of an alleged crime).




The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled unanimously in State v. Shank
that a defendant charged with first-degree murder should have been allowed to
rebut the mental elements of that crime with evidence of his mental condition on
the day he killed his wife.2 1 John Shank had been separated from his wife and
had lost custody of their children to her. Unable to find work, in the days and
weeks before the killing Mr. Shank had been depressed, drank heavily, and used
cocaine and amphetamines. He awoke early on January 6, 1986, and, after
smoking two marijuana cigarettes, drove to the Cleveland County Health De-
partment where Ms. Shank worked. 22 Defendant convinced his wife to step
outside her office building, where the couple argued over whether he could visit
the children. After Ms. Shank told him he would never see the children again,
defendant pulled out a gun. As Ms. Shank ran, defendant shot her. After she
fell to the parking lot pavement, he shot her four more times and then drove
away. A few minutes later he telephoned his brother and said he had done
"something stupid . . . shot Delaree .... [Because she] wouldn't leave [him]
alone." 23
Defendant was charged with first-degree murder by premeditation and de-
liberation. 24 At trial, he testified that he did not remember the shooting.25 A
forensic psychiatrist testified that, at the time he shot his wife, defendant suffered
from "psychogenic amnesia" triggered by his obsessive concerns about the chil-
dren and his wife's threat never to let him see them again.26 The psychiatrist
also testified that defendant's mental problems were not severe enough to pre-
vent him from knowing right from wrong. 27
Defendant did not plead the insanity defense, but asserted that at the time
of the shooting his ability to premeditate and deliberate was impaired by mental
disorders. 28 The trial judge refused to allow a psychiatrist to testify that in his
opinion defendant was unable to make or carry out plans on the day of the
killing, and that in his opinion defendant was under the influence of mental or
emotional disturbance at the time of the killing.29 The trial judge also refused to
instruct the jury that it could consider defendant's mental disorders in deciding
20. See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
21. State v. Shank, 322 N.C. 243, 249, 367 S.E.2d 639, 643 (1988).
22. Id. at 243-44, 367 S.E.2d at 641.
23. Id. at 244, 367 S.E.2d at 640. Defendant tried to flee the state but was arrested later that
day. Id.
24. Id. at 243, 367 S.E.2d at 640. North Carolina defines first-degree murder as "any ...
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1986). In addition to pre-
meditation and deliberation, the prosecution must also prove malice and specific intent to kill. E.g.,
State v. Hamby, 276 N.C. 674, 678, 174 S.E.2d 385, 387 (1970).
25. Shank, 322 N.C. at 245, 367 S.E.2d at 641.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 246, 367 S.E.2d at 641. This is a shorthand answer for North Carolina's insanity
defense test, based on the M'Naghten test, discussed infra at note 73.
28. Shank, 322 N.C. at 245, 367 S.E.2d at 641.
29. Id. at 246, 367 S.E.2d at 641. The trial court ruled that the psychiatric testimony was
inadmissible because it constituted an "ultimate issue"-whether defendant formed the requisite
intent for first degree murder, which the trial court declared was "a question of fact for the jury." Id.
at 247, 367 S.E,2d at 642. The supreme court noted that under rule 704 of the North Carolina Rules
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whether he premeditated and deliberated his wife's killing. 30 The court did,
however, instruct the jury that in determining the mens rea issues it could con-
sider defendant's use of drugs. 31 Defendant was convicted of first-degree mur-
der and sentenced to life imprisonment. 32
Defendant appealed directly to the North Carolina Supreme Court, which
held that the trial judge's exclusion of the psychiatrist's opinion was error re-
quiring a new trial.33 The court based its decision on a number of North Caro-
lina Rules of Evidence.34 First the court corrected the trial judge's reasoning
that expert opinion should not be admitted if it resolved an ultimate issue that
the jury was to decide,3 5 quoting rule 704's provision that "[t]estimony in the
form of an opinion or inference is not objectionable because it embraces an ulti-
mate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."'36 The court further held that the
testimony was admissible under rule 401 because "testimony tending to show
that defendant did not have the capacity to premeditate or deliberate was rele-
vant in determining the presence or absence of an element of the offense with
which he was charged."'37 The court finally held that the testimony was admis-
sible under rule 702 because it was within the psychiatrist's specialized knowl-
edge and would help the jury decide facts at issue.38 The court did not discuss
its implicit recognition that a defendant's mental condition short of legal in-
sanity could affect his culpability in a specific intent crime, strictly framing the
decision as a evidentiary matter.3 9 Nor did the court acknowledge that Shank
was the first holding in this state in favor of the diminished capacity defense.
Instead, the court quoted dictum from a landmark 1975 decision, State v.
Cooper,4° that actually rejected the diminished capacity defense where the de-
fendant had also pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity.4 1 The Shank court
of Evidence, evidence that embraces an ultimate issue is not for that reason inadmissible. Id. (citing
N.C. R. EvID. 704).
30. Brief for Defendant at 13, Shank, 322 N.C. 243, 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988) (No. 734A86). The
supreme court did not mention the jury instruction issue, probably because it ordered a new trial on
another ground. The Shank court's overruling of State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144
(1983) and State v. Anderson, 303 N.C. 185, 278 S.E.2d 238 (1981), decisions that upheld the refusal
of jury instructions, indicates that such instructions must now be given if supported by admissible
evidence.
31. Brief for Defendant at 13, Shank, 323 N.C. 243, 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988) (No. 734A86). This
instruction recognized what is known as the intoxication defense. See infra notes 78-80 and accom-
panying text.
32. Shank, 322 N.C. at 243, 367 S.E.2d at 640.
33. Id. at 249, 367 S.E.2d at 643.
34. Id. at 247-49, 367 S.E.2d at 642-43 (citing N.C. R. EvID. 401, 403, 702, 704).
35. Id. at 247-48, 367 S.E.2d at 642.
36. Id. (quoting N.C. R. EVD. 704).
37. Id. at 249, 367 S.E.2d at 643.
38. Id. at 248, 367 S.E.2d at 643.
39. Although evidence of mental condition is logically relevant to any offense for which a stat-
ute lists a required mental state, courts have cited other factors, such as the protection of society, to
justify exceptions to relevancy and other evidence principles. See, e.g., Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d
1250, 1258 (7th Cir.) (expressly leaving open the issue whether diminished capacity defense should
apply if it would result in acquittal rather than a reduction in offense grade), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S.
801 (1978).
40. 286 N.C. 549, 213 S.E.2d 305 (1975).
41. Shank, 322 N.C. at 250-51, 367 S.E.2d at 644 (citing Cooper, 286 N.C. at 572-73, 213
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held that the Cooper rule does not apply where defendants seek to introduce
"evidence of mental disorders, not to support a defense of insanity, but to show
that they did not have the capacity to premeditate and deliberate at the time of
the killings."'42 The court also expressly overruled two decisions in which, rely-
ing on Cooper, it had refused to require jury instructions on diminished capacity
in cases where defendants had not pleaded insanity.4 3
Six months after the Shank decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court in
State v. Rose44 held that a defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on dimin-
ished capacity even though the defendant also had pleaded not guilty by reason
of insanity.45 Melvin Rose, Jr., without provocation, fatally shot two friends
early in the morning of January 30, 1987.46 The victims, Danny Bateman and
Jill Alexander, had been drinking alcohol and watching television with defend-
ant and his wife in their Columbia, North Carolina, home. After returning from
a trip into town during which he displayed guns and shot out a window, defend-
ant left his guests in the living room and went into the bedroom without speak-
ing. Ten minutes later defendant entered the living room and fired a .410
shotgun at Jill Alexander's head, killing her. Before Danny Bateman could get
out the door, defendant shot him with a .22 rifle. Defendant chased Bateman
across the street and shot him in the head, killing him.4 7 Defendant then told a
third guest to go home.48 When a deputy sheriff arrived, defendant confessed to
the killings. "Handcuff me and shoot me," he said. Defendant then insisted on
showing the bodies to the deputy.49
Tried on two counts of first-degree murder, defendant pleaded that at the
time of the shootings he was either legally insane or, if not insane, was by virtue
of his state of mind incapable of premeditation or deliberation or of forming a
specific intent to kill.50 A psychiatrist testified that defendant was experiencing
a psychotic episode on the night of the shootings and did not understand his
actions or know right from wrong.5 1 The psychiatrist also testified that defend-
ant could not have formed the specific intent to kill Ms. Alexander and Mr.
Bateman. 52 The psychiatrist was not allowed to answer defense counsel's ques-
tion whether, in the expert's opinion, defendant could have premeditated or de-
liberated the killings.5 3 The trial judge instructed the jury on the insanity
S.E.2d at 320). The dictum from Cooper and the reasoning supporting it are discussed infra at notes
91-93 and accompanying text.
42. Shank, 322 N.C. at 251, 367 S.E.2d at 644.
43. Id. The court overruled State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983), and State v.
Anderson, 303 N.C. 185, 278 S.E.2d 238 (1981), "[i]nsofar as [they] are inconsistent with this opin-
ion." Shank, 322 N.C. at 251, 367 S.E.2d at 644; see supra note 30.
44. 323 N.C. 455, 373 S.E.2d 426 (1988).
45. Id. at 457-58, 373 S.E.2d at 428-29.
46. Id. at 456, 373 S.E.2d at 427.
47. Id.
48. Brief for Defendant at 7, Rose, 323 N.C. 455, 373 S.E.2d 426 (1988) (No. 54A88).
49. Id. at 5-6.
50. Rose, 323 N.C. at 456, 373 S.E.2d at 427.
51. Id. at 456-57, 373 S.E.2d at 427-28.
52. Id. at 457, 373 S.E.2d at 427.
53. Id. at 459, 373 S.E.2d at 429.
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defense, but refused to tell the jury that it could consider defendant's mental
condition in connection with his ability to form the specific intent to kill. 4 De-
fendant was found guilty of first degree murder in Bateman's death and guilty of
second degree murder in Alexander's death. 5" He was sentenced to life plus fifty
years and appealed directly to the North Carolina Supreme Court.5 6
The supreme court found prejudicial error in the trial court's refusal to
instruct jurors that they could consider mental condition in determining specific
intent. The supreme court set aside the first degree murder conviction and or-
dered a new trial. 57 Because specific intent, premeditation, and deliberation are
not elements of second degree murder in North Carolina, the court found no
error in defendant's second degree murder conviction.5 8 The court cited State v.
Shank to support the admissibility of testimony concerning specific intent. 59
The court, however, found no error in the trial judge's exclusion of expert testi-
mony concerning defendant's ability to premeditate and deliberate.6 The court
explained that those words were legal terms of art not sufficiently understood by
the expert to qualify his opinion.61
A brief description of the diminished capacity defense will make the facts
and results of Shank and Rose more understandable. As the defense operates, it
denies that a defendant formed a mental state that is an element of the crime he
is accused of committing, therefore preventing conviction for that crime.62 Un-
like the insanity defense, an affirmative defense for which the burden of persua-
sion may be imposed on the defendant, 63 the diminished capacity defense
negates an element within the state's burden of proof.64 By keeping the burden
54. Id. at 457, 373 S.E.2d at 428.
55. Id. at 456, 373 S.E.2d at 427.
56. Id. at 455, 373 S.E.2d at 427.
57. Id. at 458, 373 S.E.2d at 428-29.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 457-58, 373 S.E.2d at 428.
60. Id. at 460, 373 S.E.2d at 429-30.
61. Id.; see supra note 14; infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text (legal terms not under-
stood by an expert are inadmissible under N.C. R. EvID. 702).
62. See P. ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 101 (diminished capacity defense described as "failure of
proof" defense); Sendor, supra note 1, at 1430.
63. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202-10 (1977) (New York statute requiring defendant
to prove extreme emotional disturbance by preponderance of evidence held constitutional because
defense "does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order to
convict of murder"); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952) (Oregon statute requiring defend-
ant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt not violative of due process clause).
64. Bowen v. Kemp, 832 F.2d 546, 550 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) ("The defendant's burden of
proving insanity as a defense does not impose the burden of proving lack of the required intent"),
cert. denied, Kemp v. Dix, 108 S. Ct. 1120 (1988), Kemp v. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. 1247 (1988); Hughes
v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir. 1976) (specific intent to kill is an element of murder that
the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); United States
v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1000-01 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (decision allowing diminished capacity
evidence to negate specific intent).
"Burden of proof" in this Note refers to the burden of persuasion and not to the burden of
production.
The burden of production refers to the obligation to raise an issue. The burden of persua-
sion refers to the risk of uncertainty as to the issue's resolution. Thus, the party bearing
the burden of production will have an issue resolved against him if it is not raised by the
1298 [Vol. 67
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of persuasion on the prosecution and attempting to create only a reasonable
doubt about a mental element of an offense, the diminished capacity defense is
more likely to succeed than the insanity defense.65 Use of the defense typically
will not result in acquittal, however, because it does not preclude conviction for
a lower grade offense that does not require proof of a specific mental state. 66
The term "diminished capacity defense" is a misnomer, because this doc-
trine recognizes not an independent defense but a rule of relevancy: if a criminal
offense is defined by a mental element, evidence of a defendant's defective mental
condition logically should be allowed to rebut evidence presented by the prose-
cution concerning the existence of that element. 67 Strictly speaking, a showing
of diminished capacity is only necessary to allow the logical deduction that a
defendant without capacity in fact could not have formed a state of mind re-
quired for a particular criminal offense. 68
evidence. The party bearing the burden of persuasion will have an issue resolved against
him if, after all the evidence is considered, the trier of fact remains uncertain on the point.
Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J.
1325, 1329 n.8 (1979). The burdens of production and persuasion in the context of specific intent are
discussed in H. BRANDIS, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 234 (3d ed. 1988).
65. Cf. State v. Mash, 323 N.C. 339, 346, 372 S.E.2d 532, 537 (1988) (negating defense of
intoxication "need only raise a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant formed the requisite intent
to kill required for conviction of first-degree murder in order for defendant to prevail on this issue").
This comparison is based on the difference in burdens and refers to jurisdictions which place the
burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove an insanity defense.
66. Most courts have allowed the defense to negate only specific intent crimes. See, e.g., State
v. Beach, 102 N.M. 642, 699 P.2d 115 (1985); Wagner v. State, 687 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984); see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-6.2 (Tent. Draft) (Am. Bar
Ass'n 1983) ("In the great majority of cases, the evidence concerning a defendant's abnormal mental
condition will, if believed, do no more than reduce the grade of the offense."); Mandiberg, Protecting
Society and Defendants Too: The Constitutional Dilemma of Mental Abnormality and Intoxication
Defenses, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 221, 228 (1984) (diminished capacity can only negate subjective
mens rea requirements, which author says are limited to specific intent crimes). But see Hendershott
v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982) (due process requires that diminished capacity defense be
allowed to negate general intent crimes), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1225 (1983). The Model Penal Code,
which abolishes all distinctions between specific and general intent crimes, recognizes the diminished
capacity defense in any case where the defendant's mental state is an element of the offense. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). One commentator has argued that diminished
mental capacity should also negate general intent because "general intent crimes presuppose a mini-
mal ability to act voluntarily." Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility
Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 832 n.25 (1977).
Public policy may justify a prohibition of the diminished capacity defense in cases where no
lesser general intent crime exists to punish a defendant whose mental state negates a mental element
of the crime. See, e.g., Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S.
801 (1978); infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. But see People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318,
328, 583 P.2d 1308, 1315, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265, 272 (1978) (diminished capacity defense "extends to
all specific intent crimes, whether or not they encompass lesser included offenses. ... [W]e do not
perceive how a defendant who has in his possession evidence which rebuts an element of the crime
can logically be denied the right to present that evidence merely because it will result in his acquit-
tal."), superseded by 1981 Cal. Stat. 404 § 4 (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 28, 29 (West
1988)).
67. Bowen v. Kemp, 832 F.2d 546, 550 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, Kemp v. Dix,
108 S. Ct. 1120 (1988), Kemp v. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. 1247 (1988); United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d
971, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc); Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases for Purposes
Other Than the Defense of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051, 1090 (1975).
68. State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 593-94, 213 S.E.2d 305, 333 (1975) (Sharp, C.J., dissenting)
(citing authority from other jurisdictions that evidence of defendant's mental condition is admissible
when considering whether the accused had the capacity to form intent "and whether he did so").
One commentator has recommended scrapping the term "capacity" from the defense, which he calls
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Although most crimes include a mens rea element, the concept of negating
that element is obscured by the more famous insanity defense, which excuses
criminal behavior even when mens rea elements are established. Because dimin-
ished capacity may result from mental disorder similar to but milder than disor-
der constituting legal insanity, 69 in particular cases the defense may serve as a
feasible alternative to a dubious insanity defense.70 A brief description of the
insanity defense therefore sheds light on the diminished capacity defense.
The insanity defense in North Carolina asserts that the defendant at the
time of an alleged offense was incapable of knowing the nature and quality of an
act or incapable of distinguishing right from wrong in relation to that act,
7 1
thereby providing a complete excuse for one who otherwise could be guilty.
72
North Carolina's standard for legal insanity, like the test employed in over half
of American jurisdictions, is derived from the insanity test in M'Naghten's
Case.73 Because the insanity defense is an affirmative defense not negating any
element of the crime, the burden of persuasion as well as the burden of produc-
the "mens rea variant." Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 44 (1984). "The real question is whether the defendant actually formed a requisite
mens rea, and all testimony on this issue should be directed towards showing what actually went on
in the defendant's mind." Id.
One writer has expressed concern that the capacity standard requires the defendant to show
more than is necessary to negate a mens rea element. "If it seems to a jury that the only way it can
find intent to have been absent is if it was not possible, conviction is probable." Clark, Clinical Limits
of Expert Testimony on Diminished Capacity, 5 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 155, 162 (1982); see also
Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for
Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 475-76 (1980) (expert witness should be allowed to
testify as to the probability that defendant actually had the requisite state of mind at a given time).
But see Lewin, supra note 67, at 1065 ("Requiring the expert to testify that he has an opinion as to
the exact state of mind at the time of the crime would seem to ask the impossible.").
69. P. ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 64(a) n. I (both defenses are often raised at trial when defense
attorney is unsure which, if any, the jury might believe).
70. In jurisdictions that place the burden of persuasion on the prosecution to prove sanity, a
prosecution that has carried its burden is perhaps more likely to prevail over a diminished capacity
defense. But as demonstrated by the examples in Clark, supra note 68, at 167-68, legally sane people
suffering from mental disorders can commit criminal acts without the requisite criminal intent. A
more common type of defendant who may be legally sane but lack a criminally defined mental state
is a mentally retarded person. See, e.g., State v. Gonzales, 140 Ariz. 349, 352-53, 681 P.2d 1368,
1371-72 (1984) (evidence that defendant was mildly retarded might have raised reasonable doubt
whether he understood circumstances well enough to have knowingly restrained victim).
71. State v. Mize, 315 N.C. 285, 289, 337 S.E.2d 562, 565 (1985); NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Crim. § 304.10 (1986).
72. State v. Swink, 229 N.C. 123, 125, 47 S.E.2d 852, 853 (1948) (insanity exempts defendant
from criminal responsibility).
73. 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210 (1843). In M'Naghten the Queen's Bench
announced this test:
[To establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the
time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing, or if he did know it that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
Id.; W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 2, § 4.2(a). This Note will not discuss the insanity defense
or its various tests in detail. For discussions of other tests, see W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note
2, §§ 4.2(d), 4.3 (discussing contemporary insanity tests); Sendor, supra note 1, at 1380-94 (survey-
ing the "major modem insanity defenses used or proposed in Anglo-American law, beginning with
the M'Naghten test"); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (insanity
defined as one's lack of "substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law").
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tion may be imposed-and in North Carolina is imposed-on the defendant. 74
The diminished capacity defense may benefit a defendant who has failed to prove
insanity but may have raised some doubt about mental elements that the state
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.75 At least one court has confused the
diminished capacity defense with the insanity defense, failing to recognize any
distinction between the two. 76 The confusion is understandable when the same
evidence may be used to show both defenses. 77
Although diminished capacity is most similar to the insanity defense in its
symptoms, its function as a negating defense is more similar to the defense of
intoxication. In North Carolina, as in many other states, evidence of voluntary
intoxication (usually by alcohol) is admissible to negate premeditation and delib-
eration in first degree murder cases. 78 To be entitled to a jury instruction on the
intoxication defense, a defendant in North Carolina must meet the relatively
high burden of production of introducing evidence that intoxication rendered
him "utterly incapable" of forming the alleged mens rea.79 In some jurisdictions
the intoxication defense provided the initial rationale for allowing the dimin-
ished capacity defense.80
North Carolina juries are instructed that premeditation means a defendant
"formed the intent to kill the victim over some period of time, however short,
before he acted." 8' Likewise, the term deliberation means "in a cool state of
74. The defendant asserting insanity usually need only persuade the jury by a preponderance of
evidence, even though states may constitutionally require proof of insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798-99 (1952). Some states place only a burden of produc-
tion on the defendant to raise the issue of insanity and place the burden of persuasion on the prosecu-
tion to prove sanity. E.g., State v. Doyle, 117 Ariz. 349, 351, 572 P.2d 1187, 1189 (1977). The
defendant must prove insanity only to the satisfaction of the jury. State v. Heptinstall, 309 N.C. 231,
237, 306 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1983).
75. An early New York decision demonstrates the relationship between the insanity defense
and the diminished capacity defense:
Feebleness of mind or will, even though not so extreme as to justify a finding that the
defendant is irresponsible, may properly be considered by the triers of the facts in deter-
mining whether a homicide has been committed with a deliberate and premeditated design
to kill, and may thus be effective to reduce the grade of the offense.
People v. Moran, 249 N.Y. 179, 180, 163 N.E. 553, 553 (1928); see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 75
Pa. 403, 408 (1874) (defendant may not be convicted in absence of required mens rea "whether it is
caused by insanity, intoxication, or other controlling influences").
76. Sprague v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 89, 187 N.W.2d 784 (1971).
77. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); People
v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 328, 583 P.2d 1308, 1315, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265, 272 (1978), superseded by
1981 Cal. Stat. 404 § 4 (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 28, 29 (West 1988)).
78. State v. Mash, 323 N.C. 339, 347, 372 S.E.2d 532, 537 (1988); State v. Wilson, 280 N.C.
674, 681, 187 S.E.2d 22, 26 (1972); State v. Propst, 274 N.C. 62, 71-72, 161 S.E.2d 560, 567 (1968);
NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Crim. § 305.11 (1986).
79. Mash, 323 N.C. at 348, 372 S.E.2d at 537. Evidence that a defendant's blood alcohol would
violate the law against drunken driving is not sufficient to entitle him to submit the intoxication
defense to the jury. Id. (citing State v. Medley, 295 N.C. 75, 243 S.E.2d 374 (1978)); cf. State v.
Propst, 274 N.C. 62, 71, 161 S.E.2d 560, 568 (1968) (intoxication evidence was sufficient for jury
consideration although defendant, a schizophrenic, was not so drunk as to be "utterly unable" to
form specific intent).
80. E.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 971, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en bane); State v.
Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312 (1959) (cited in State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 594, 213 S.E.2d
305, 334 (1975) (Sharp, C.J., dissenting)).
81. NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Crim. § 206.10 (1987).
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mind.., with a fixed purpose, not under the influence of some suddenly aroused
violent passion."182 Case law has elaborated very little on these definitions.8 3
The intent to kill is defined as "a mental attitude seldom provable by direct
evidence" that "must ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may
be inferred."'8 4 Juries also are told that they may infer premeditation and delib-
eration from circumstances including lack of provocation by the victim, conduct
by the defendant before, during and after the time of the killing, threats and
declarations by the defendant, and the use of grossly excessive force.8 5
The diminished capacity defense, rarely discussed in North Carolina cases,
was first addressed by the state supreme court in State v. Cooper.8 6 Defendant in
Cooper was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic after he killed his wife and
four of their five children under the delusion that the children had been sent
from outer space to kill him.8 7 Charged with five counts of first-degree murder,
he pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity; a jury rejected that defense. Upon
conviction on all five counts,8 8 defendant appealed and assigned error to the trial
court's failure to instruct the jury that it should consider evidence that his
mental illness may have impaired his ability to kill with premeditation and delib-
eration.8 9 The supreme court found no error in the trial court's failure so to
instruct the jury.9 0 The court acknowledged that:
a defendant who does not have the mental capacity to form an intent
to kill, or to premeditate and deliberate upon the killing, cannot be
lawfully convicted of murder in the first degree, whether such mental
deficiency be due to a disease of the mind, intoxication,... or some
other cause. 91
The court then explained why its decision should be distinguished from the gen-
eral rule of law:
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., State v. Tysor, 307 N.C. 679, 683, 300 S.E.2d 366, 368 (1983) (deliberation does
not mean defendant was calm or tranquil, but that emotion "must not have been such as to disturb
the defendant's faculties and reason"); State v. Misenheimer, 304 N.C. 108, 113, 282 S.E.2d 791, 795
(1981) (if intent to kill is premeditated and deliberated, it does not matter that intent is executed
while defendant is excited); State v. Corn, 303 N.C. 293, 297, 278 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1981) (intent
must arise from "a fixed determination previously formed after weighing the matter") (quoting State
v. Exum, 138 N.C. 599, 618, 50 S.E.2d 283, 289 (1905)).
84. NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Crim. § 206.10 (1987).
85. Id.
86. 286 N.C. 549, 213 S.E.2d 305 (1975).
87. Id. at 558, 213 S.E.2d at 311-12. Before authorities discovered the bodies in the family's
apartment, defendant told a doctor of his acts and asked if he had done the right thing. Id.
88. Id. at 552, 213 S.E.2d at 305.
89. Id. at 572, 213 S.E.2d at 320. Defendant did not request a diminished capacity instruction
at trial but assigned error to the trial court's failure to give the instruction sua sponte. Id. at 595, 213
S.E.2d at 334 (Sharp, C.J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 573, 213 S.E.2d at 321. The court found no other error in the jury instructions,
which included a typical first-degree murder charge and an instruction on the insanity defense, But
the court suggested the procedure could be improved by instructing jurors to consider the insanity
defense before considering whether elements of the offense had been proved. The suggested proce-
dure would avoid wasted time when jurors found a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. at
571, 213 S.E.2d at 320.
91. Id. at 572, 213 S.E.2d at 320. This sentence was quoted in Shank. 322 N.C. at 251, 367
S.E.2d at 644.
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The jury, by its verdict, has established that the defendant, at the time
of the alleged offenses, had the mental capacity to know right from
wrong with reference to these acts.,
Jt requires less mental ability to form a purpose to do an act
than to determine its moral quality. The jury, by its verdict, has estab-
lished that this defendant, at the time he killed his wife and the four
little children, had this higher level of mental capacity. It necessarily
follows that he had the lesser, included capacity [to premeditate and
deliberate]. 92
The court cited no authority for its formula defining the ability to form specific
intent as a necessary component of the ability to determine right from wrong.93
Chief Justice Sharp dissented in a lengthy opinion, advocating that the
court follow other jurisdictions' position "that mental disease short of legal in-
sanity may be considered in determining whether the accused at the time of the
alleged homicide was capable of forming a premeditated and deliberate intent to
kill, and whether he did so."'94 The dissent argued that ajury instruction to that
effect should be given in first degree murder cases where the state was required
to prove premeditation and deliberation and where "substantial evidence" indi-
cated that the defendant at the time of the killing was suffering from "a recog-
nized serious mental disease and engaged in abnormal behavior characteristic of
such disease."195 The chief justice drew an analogy to North Carolina decisions
recognizing that intoxication could negate the premeditation and deliberation
elements of first degree murder.96 The Cooper majority had summarily distin-
guished the intoxication cases, noting that in those cases the jury had not deter-
mined that defendants knew right from wrong.97
92. Cooper, 286 N.C. at 572-73, 213 S.E.2d at 321 (emphasis added).
93. See Note, supra note 1, at 998 (criticizing Cooper court for "recognizing a theory that
should not be judicially noticed, since it is not well established or authoritatively settled"). The
United States Supreme Court has invalidated on due process grounds a statute which operated in a
manner analogous to that of the formula followed in Cooper. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698
(1975) (due process is violated by a statute requiring defendant to disprove, in effect, an element of
first-degree murder in order to limit his conviction to the lesser offense of manslaughter). Commen-
tators likewise have argued that these kinds of formulae violate due process. See Clark, supra note
68, at 167-68 (examples of people who have committed criminal acts while legally sane but without
specific intent); Morse, supra note 68, at 40-41 & n.138 (mens rea is rarely negated by insanity or
mental disorder per se); Comment, Diminished Capacity---Recent Decisions and an Analytical Ap-
proach, 30 VAND. L, REv. 213, 232 (1977) (citing Cooper as an example of cases that may violate
fourteenth amendment due process requirement suggested by Mullaney decision).
Two professors describe this type of formula as a "greater includes the lesser rule" and extrapo-
late from Supreme Court decisions "a movement toward requiring [for due process] that the pre-
sumed fact follow from the proved fact beyond a reasonable doubt." Jeffries & Stephan, supra note
64, at 1337 (citing Mullaney and other Supreme Court decisions).
94. Cooper, 286 N.C. at 593, 213 S.E.2d at 333 (Sharp, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 592, 213 S.E.2d at 332 (Sharp, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Sharp emphasized the
limited scope of her proposed rule by repeating it verbatim later in her opinion. Id. at 596, 213
S.E.2d at 335 (Sharp, C.J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 592-93, 213 S.E.2d at 333 (Sharp, C.J., dissenting) (citing State v. Propst, 274 N.C.
62, 71-72, 161 S.E.2d 560, 567 (1968) (evidence of alcohol consumption warranted jury instruction
on intoxication defense)).
97. Id. at 572, 213 S.E.2d at 321 (Sharp, C.J., dissenting). Neither Chief Justice Sharp nor the
majority mentioned the argument that basic fairness prohibits allowing persons impaired by intoxi-
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The supreme court followed the Cooper formula in more than a half dozen
murder cases rejecting the diminished capacity defense.98 For the most part, the
later cases simply have cited Cooper's holding without looking beyond it for
support. 99 The supreme court's summary affirmance of Cooper has led the court
to approve jury instructions that are even more detrimental to the defendant's
interest than Cooper's omission of instructions. For example, in State v. Mize 1oo
the supreme court affirmed a jury instruction that evidence of insanity be consid-
ered "only if you find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt" each
element of first-degree murder, second-degree murder or manslaughter. 101
Under this instruction, defendant argued, a juror who absent any instruction
might have considered the impact of mental condition on premeditation and
deliberatioff would understand that she could not consider such evidence until
after determining the defendant's guilt.10 2 In other words, such an instruction
prevents the use of diminished capacity evidence in the guilt phase of a trial.
More recently, the Attorney General of North Carolina cited Cooper when argu-
ing that the failure of defendant in Shank to raise the insanity defense estab-
lished his mental capacity for premeditation and deliberation purposes.10 3
Three North Carolina statutes recognize that mental disability not rising to
the level of insanity may affect culpability or, if not that, punishment. North
Carolina General Statutes section 15A-959,104 commonly known for requiring a
cation to use a defense not available to those impaired involuntarily by mental disorder. This argu-
ment, eloquently articulated in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en
banc), is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 132-33.
Chief Justice Sharp also noted that North Carolina had allowed a defendant to enter contradic-
tory pleas that he did not commit a killing or that if he did, he was insane at the time. Cooper, 286
N.C. at 590-91, 213 S.E.2d at 331-32 (Sharp, C.J., dissenting) (citing State v. Nail, 211 N.C. 61, 188
S.E. 637 (1936)). The chief justice argued:
There is no reason why a defendant may not enter simultaneously a general plea of not
guilty and a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. A plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity does not per se constitute an admission of any of the elements necessary to be
established by the State beyond a reasonable doubt as a prerequisite to a verdict of guilty.
Id. at 591, 213 S.E.2d at 332. The argument is particularly valid in the context of a diminished
capacity defense because the defendant's contention that he did not form a specific intent is not
contradictory to a contention that he was insane at the time of the offense.
98. State v. Mize, 315 N.C. 285, 337 S.E.2d 562 (1985); State v. Adcock, 310 N.C. 1, 310
S.E.2d 587 (1984); State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983), overruled by State v.
Shank, 322 N.C. 243, 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988); State v. Anderson, 303 N.C. 185, 278 S.E.2d 238
(1981), overruled by State v. Shank, 322 N.C. 243, 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988); State v. Franks, 300 N.C.
1, 265 S.E.2d 177 (1980); State v. Harris, 290 N.C. 718, 228 S.E.2d 424 (1976); State v. Shepherd,
288 N.C. 346, 218 S.E.2d 176 (1975); State v. Wetmore, 287 N.C. 344, 215 S.E.2d 51 (1975), death
penalty vacated, 428 U.S. 905 (1976). Most of these cases affirmed trial court rulings refusing to
instruct juries on the diminished capacity defense in relation to premeditation and deliberation. All
but Kirkley and Anderson involved defendants who also pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. See
also State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 307 S.E.2d 339 (1983) (rejecting diminished capacity defense to
negate intent element in armed robbery charge).
99. E.g., Mize, 315 N.C. at 293, 337 S.E.2d at 567 ("This Court has previously held that the
defendant is not entitled to an affirmative instruction that in determining whether or not defendant
acted with premeditated or deliberated malice the jury must consider his mental condition.").
100. 315 N.C. 285, 337 S.E.2d 562 (1985).
101. Id. at 295, 337 S.E.2d at 567.
102. Id.
103. State's Brief at 6, Shank, 322 N.C. 243, 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988) (No. 734A86).
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-959 (1988).
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defendant to file pretrial motions of plans to assert the insanity defense, also
requires pretrial notice if a defendant plans to introduce testimony "relating to a
mental disease, defect, or other condition bearing upon the issue of whether he
had the mental state required for the offense charged."10 5 The supreme court
has rejected the argument that section 15A-959 would not require the notice
unless such a defense were anticipated, finding it "implausible that the Criminal
Code Commission... would implant a new and far-reaching theory on North
Carolina law by implication."' 10 6 Two other statutes include mental impairment
not rising to the level of insanity as a mitigating factor to be considered in
sentencing. 107
Several federal and state appellate courts have wrestled with the diminished
capacity defense.10 8 These decisions provide a backdrop for evaluating North
Carolina law.
Significant to the diminished capacity defense are several United States
Supreme Court rulings that due process requires the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every element of an alleged crime.109 Among these decisions
Mullaney v. Wilbur 110 is most closely related to the diminished capacity de-
fense."' 1 The Court in Mullaney ruled that a state law requiring the defendant
105. Id. § 15A-959(b).
106. State v. Harris, 290 N.C. 718, 725, 228 S.E.2d 424, 429 (1976). In Harris defendant's attor-
ney requested a diminished capacity instruction based on both the text of the statute and the follow-
ing official commentary: "'[T]here may be a number of situations where the defense of insanity itself
is not technically raised but expert testimony as to mental state will be introduced to negative the
defendant's culpability with respect to some element of the offense.'" Id. at 725 (quoting N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-959 official commentary).
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2000(f)(2), 15A-1340.4(a)(2)(d) (1988). Section 15A-2000, which
lists aggravating and mitigating factors to be considered by jurors when choosing between sentences
of life imprisonment or death for first- degree murderers, includes as a mitigating circumstance that
murder "was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional distur-
bance." Id. § 15A-2000(f)(2). Section 15A-1340.4(a)(2)(d), part of the Fair Sentencing Act, lists
factors to be considered by judges in determining sentences and includes as a mitigating factor a
defendant's mental condition "that was insufficient to constitute a defense [to the crime] but signifi-
cantly reduced his culpability for the offense." Id. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)(d).
108. See infra notes 117-49 and accompanying text.
109. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 233-34 (1987) (not unconstitutional to place burden of proof
on defendant to show self-defense, as long as evidence for that defense may also be considered in
determining the sufficiency of the state's proof of the essential elements of murder); Francis v. Frank-
lin, 471 U.S. 307, 317-18 (1985) (presumption of intent, even though rebuttable, held unconstitu-
tional shifting of burden of proof to defendant in murder case); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510,
512, 524 (1979) (presumption that person intends ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts vio-
lated due process by allowing shift of burden of persuasion to defendant); Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) ("Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged,"
although burden of production may be placed on defendant to justify reasonable doubt); Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 686 n.3, 704 (1975) (due process requires state to prove absence of heat of
passion where murder statute included "malice aforethought, either express or implied," as an ele-
ment of the crime); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (requirement that state prove every
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is important where defendant faces stigma of convic-
tion and loss of liberty).
The United States Supreme Court has never considered the constitutional requirements of the
diminished capacity defense. The Court addressed diminished capacity only as a matter of substan-
tive law in Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 473-77 (1945), an appeal from the District of
Columbia, but deferred to Congress to create such a doctrine.
110. 421 U.S: 684 (1975).
111. See Comment, supra note 93, at 229-230 ("Arguably, if a failure to find insanity constitutes
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to disprove, by an affirmative defense, an intent element of murder unconstitu-
tionally shifted the burden of proof.1 12 Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring
opinion noting the continuing validity of the Court's previous ruling that a state
law requiring the criminal defendant to prove the insanity defense did not vio-
late due process. 113 He explained why the old and new decisions were both
correct: "Although... evidence relevant to insanity as defined by state law may
also be relevant to whether the required mens rea was present, the existence or
nonexistence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the existence or
nonexistence of the required mental elements of the crime."11 4
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have followed and refined the Mulla-
ney11 5 rule, carefully distinguishing between permissible burdens of persuasion
for defenses that negate offense elements and for defenses that excuse or justify
criminal behavior. 1 6 Lower federal and state appellate courts also have recog-
nized the diminished capacity defense based on similar constitutional princi-
a finding of sufficient capacity to entertain the required mens rea then the defendant who is required
to prove insanity is in effect being required to disprove the capacity aspect of the essential element of
mens rea.").
112. 421 U.S. at 701-04. The Court struck down a Maine statute requiring a defendant charged
with murder to prove that he acted in a heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to reduce his
conviction to manslaughter. Id. Even though the absence of heat of passion and sudden provocation
was not an essential element of the murder statute, malice aforethought was an essential element. Id.
at 512 n.3 (quoting ME. Ruv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (1964)). Malice is an element of second
degree murder in North Carolina, and a presumption of malice is raised when the prosecution proves
an unlawful killing by intentional use of a weapon. State v. Phillips, 264 N.C. 508, 515, 142 S.E.2d
337, 341 (1965). Following Mullaney, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that this presump-
tion of malice would be reduced to an inference once the defendant produced some evidence to
negate malice. State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 643-44, 220 S.E.2d 575, 584 (1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 432 U.S. 233 (1977).
113. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). The trial court in Leland had instructed jurors
that:
[I]n determining whether or not the defendant acted purposely and with premeditated and
deliberated malice, it is your duty to take into consideration defendant's mental condition
and all factors relating thereto, and that even though you may not find him legally insane,
if, in fact, his mentality was impaired, that evidence bears upon these factors, and it is your
duty to consider this evidence along with all the other evidence in this case.
Id. at 795 n.8.
114. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 705-06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
115. The subsequent decisions cite not only Mullaney but also its more famous precursor, In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970), in which the Court held that due process requires the prosecu-
tion to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every element of a crime defined by state
statute.
116. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). In
Patterson the Court upheld a statute that defined murder as the intentional killing of another, except
when the defendant could prove as an affirmative defense that he acted "under the influence of
extreme emotional disturbance." 432 U.S. at 200. The Court distinguished Mullaney, noting that
because the burden of proving intent remained with the prosecution, and because an emotional dis-
turbance as defined by the statute "does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State
is to prove," the state could properly place the burden of proving that defense on the defendant. Id.
at 207. In Martin the Court upheld an Ohio law defining murder as "purposely, and with prior
calculation and design, caus[ing the] death of another," and defining as an affirmative defense a
defendant's claim of self-defense. 480 U.S. at 230 (citing OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (Ander-
son 1982)). The Court, as in Patterson, held that the affirmative defense excused purposeful killing
and did not negate any element of murder. Id. at 233. The Court also reasoned that instructions to
the jury allowed it to consider all the evidence-including evidence introduced to show self-de-




pies, 117 as well as public policy1 18 and evidentiary principles. 1 19
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits
have held that the exclusion of evidence of mental impairment, coupled with a
jury instruction allowing a permissive presumption of intent, violated defend-
ants' due process rights. 120 The Eleventh Circuit's en banc decision in Bowen v.
Kemp spoke to the relationship between diminished capacity and insanity and
rejected the type of formula that the North Carolina Supreme Court defined in
State v. Cooper.121 The Bowen court held that a jury's rejection of the accused's
insanity defense "does not mean it found that the defendant was totally free of
mental infirmity or that his capacity to formulate a specific intent was the same
as that of a normal or average person." 122 An uncertain jury, the court noted,
could have rejected defendant's insanity defense and at the same time decided
that the prosecution failed to prove intent. 123 Accordingly, the court held that
intent remained an issue for the jury and thus an instruction that intent could be
presumed coupled with the exclusion of evidence to negate intent was unconsti-
tutional. 124  In Hughes v. Mathews12 5 the Seventh Circuit similarly held that a
jury instruction allowing a rebuttable presumption of intent coupled with the
exclusion of psychiatric testimony that could have rebutted the presumption un-
constitutionally relieved the state of its burden of proof.126 The Hughes court
also held that the exclusion of diminished capacity evidence was by itself uncon-
stitutional.127 Under the sixth and fourteenth amendments a criminal defendant
has the right to call witnesses in his behalf, with the result that a trial judge
could not exclude competent, relevant psychiatric evidence for the defense with-
out justification. 12 8 The state's fear that a new defense would set free criminals
who were not legally insane did not justify excluding psychiatric evidence to
negate intent, the court held, in a case such as Hughes in which the defense
would only reduce the degree of guilt, not gain acquittal.129 The court's distinc-
117. Eg., Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
118. E.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en bane).
119. Eg., State v. Gonzales, 140 Ariz. 349, 681 P.2d 1368 (1984).
120. Bowen v. Kemp, 832 F.2d 546, 550 (1 lth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, Kemp v. Dix, 108 S. Ct.
1120 (1988), Kemp v. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. 1247 (1988); Hughes, 576 F.2d at 1255.
121. See Bowen, 832 F.2d at 549-5 1. For a discussion of the North Carolina formula, see supra
text accompanying notes 91-93, infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
122. Bowen, 832 F.2d at 550. Although four dissenters argued that overwhelming evidence in
the case rendered the error harmless, all agreed with the majority statement that legal sanity may not
be equated with capacity. Id. at 551-54 (Roney, C.J., dissenting in part).
123. Id. at 550.
124. Id. at 551. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had previously
held that instructing the jury that intent could be presumed would be harmless error in a case if
intent were not at issue or if evidence of defendant's guilt were overwhelming. Id. at 548.
125. 576 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir.), cert dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
126. Id. at 1255.
127. Id. at 1255-58. Contra Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124, 1144-45 (7th Cir. 1983) (divided
panel held exclusion of diminished capacity evidence not unconstitutional), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1228 (1984).
128. Hughes, 576 F.2d at 1255-56 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); and
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)).
129. Id. at 1258. The court reserved, however, a more difficult issue: "We expressly leave open
the question of whether the State's fear of the 'guilty' going free is sufficient justification for exclud-
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tion between results to be gained from the defense thus injected a policy consid-
eration into the constitutional analysis.
Policy decisions about the diminished capacity defense are most often dis-
cussed by courts reviewing substantive, rather than constitutional, appeals of
criminal cases. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit decided en banc in United States v. Brawner13 0 that expert testimony
about a defendant's abnormal mental condition should be admitted "if it is rele-
vant to negative, or establish, the specific mental condition that is an element of
the crime." 13 1 The court based its decision on an analogy to the intoxication
defense: 132
Neither logic nor justice can tolerate a jurisprudence that defines the
elements of an offense as requiring a mental state such that one defend-
ant can properly argue that his voluntary drunkenness removed his
capacity to form the specific intent but another defendant is inhibited
from a submission of his contention that an abnormal mental condi-
tion, for which he was in no way responsible, negated his capacity to
form a particular specific intent, even though the condition did not
exonerate him from all criminal responsibility.13 3
Although several courts have followed Brawner's holding,13 4 the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals criticized sharply what it deemed to be a "flawed"
analogy between mental impairment and intoxication. 135 "Unlike the notion of
partial or relative insanity," the court explained in Bethea v. United States, 36
"conditions such as intoxication, medication, epilepsy, infancy, or senility are, in
varying degrees, susceptible to quantification or objective demonstration, and to
lay understanding."' 137 The Bethea court agreed that psychiatric testimony is
generally relevant to the issue of intent,' 38 but cautioned against "the unwar-
ranted additional assumption that the psychiatric sciences are capable of direct
proof of the existence of the necessary mental state as defined by law.' 139
In spite of concerns such as those of the Bethea court, more than half the
states have adopted the diminished capacity defense to some degree' 40 by stat-
ing psychiatric testimony on the issue of capacity to form intent when there is no lesser included
crime of which, absent specific intent, a defendant would be guilty." Id.
130. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc). This was not a constitutional review, but instead a
substantive review of an appeal from the District of Columbia. Id. at 973.
131. Id. at 1002.
132. Id. at 998-99.
133. Id.
134. E.g., Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1257 n.19 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801(1978); United States v. Gold, 661 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D.D.C. 1987).
135. Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 88 (D.C. App. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911
(1977).
136. Id.
137. Id.; accord Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 94-97, 294 N.W.2d 2, 12 (1980).
138. See Bethea, 365 A.2d at 86 n.46.
139. Id. The incompatibility of scientific and legal concepts of intent has been acknowledged as
problematic in the diminished capacity context. See Dix, Psychological Abnormality as a Factor in
Grading Criminal Liability: Diminished Capacity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Like, 62 J.
CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 313, 324-25 (1971).
140. P. ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 101(b) (diminished capacity negating mens rea recognized in
most jurisdictions, either in all cases in which intent is an element, only those cases in which specific
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ute141 or case law. 14 2 Some states allow the defense to be raised to negate any
mental state that is an element of any offense; 143 some allow the defense to ne-
gate specific intent elements only; 14 and some allow it to negate only specific
intent elements of murder.145 Exactly what range of disorders would be consid-
ered relevant to mens rea is unclear, but several courts have excluded evidence of
emotional or volitional impairment, distinguishing it from cognitive impair-
ment. 146 At least one state court has held that evidence of mental retardation is
relevant to a mens rea element. 147 Since a federal insanity defense was first codi-
fied in 1984148 in a statute making no mention of a defense that could negate
mental elements of offenses, federal courts have disputed whether the statute
leaves room for the diminished capacity defense.149
intent is an element, or only murder cases in which premeditation and deliberation are elements).
For a categorical list of states that have adopted the diminished capacity defense in varying degrees
and states that have rejected it, see id. § 64(a) nn.3-6.
California led the nation in developing the diminished capacity defense in a series of decisions
beginning with the holding that psychiatric evidence was admissible to negate the element of malice
aforethought defined in an assault statute. People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 357, 202 P.2d 53, 65,
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836 (1949). Typical of the doctrine's development is the decision in People v.
Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 321, 583 P.2d 1308, 1317, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265, 267 (1978), superseded by
1981 Cal. Stat. 404 § 4 (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(a)-(b) (West 1988)), holding that
psychiatric evidence was admissible to show that a psychotic person had no intent to burglarize an
apartment when he broke in under the delusion that it was his own home. The Wetmore court noted
that "if the evidence of a defendant's mental illness indicates that the defendant lacked the specific
intent to commit the charged crime such evidence [on the intent issue] cannot reasonably be ignored
merely because it might (but might not) also persuade the trier of fact that the defendant is insane."
Id. at 324, 583 P.2d at 1321, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 269. More extreme examples of the defense include a
case in which defendant successfully argued that depression and the effects of too much sugary junk
food-the infamous "Twinkie" defense-negated specific intent to commit murder. See Getting Off?
Depression as a Defense, TIME, May 28, 1979, at 57. Shortly after this case was decided, the Califor-
nia statute was amended to prohibit the diminished capacity defense. CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(a)-(b)
(West 1988); cf. Zamora v. State, 361 So. 2d 776, 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (rejecting "T.V. intoxica-
tion" as a defense to first degree murder), cert. denied, 372 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1978).
141. See, eg., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-803 (1987) (evidence of mental impairment admissible
to negate mental element of any offense).
142. See cases cited supra note 66 for examples of decisions permitting in varying degrees the
diminished capacity defense.
143. See, eg., State v. Gonzales, 140 Ariz. 349, 681 P.2d 1368 (1984); Robinson v. Common-
wealth, 569 S.W.2d 183 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
144. See, eg., Wagner v. State, 687 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Holcomb, 643
S.W.2d 336 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982).
145. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Garcia, 505 Pa. 304, 479 A.2d 473 (1984); Commonwealth v.
Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 405 N.E.2d 927 (1980).
146. E.g., Commonwealth v. Kenny, 326 Pa. Super. 425, 429-30, 474 A.2d 313, 315-16 (1984)
(lack of emotional control held to be "irresistible impulse" and not diminished capacity). For exam-
ples demonstrating the difference between volitional and cognitive defects, see Sendor, supra note 1,
at 1403-04. Sometimes a cognitive defect can contribute to volitional impairment. See Sendor, supra
note 1, at 1411-12.
147. See State v. Gonzales, 140 Ariz. 349, 353, 681 P.2d 1368, 1370-72 (1984) (exclusion of
psychiatrist's testimony that defendant was mentally retarded violated due process by reducing pros-
ecution's burden of proving knowlege element of unlawful imprisonment). North Carolina courts
have rejected evidence of mental retardation to negate premeditation and deliberation. State v.
Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 596, 213 S.E.2d 305, 335 (1975) (Sharp, C.J., dissenting) (citing State v.
Scales, 242 N.C. 400, 87 S.E.2d 916 (1955)).
148. Federal Insanity Defense Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (Supp. IV 1986) (originally codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1984)).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 903 (3d Cir. 1987) (Congress eliminated
any excusing defense other than insanity but did not preclude the use of relevant psychiatric evi-
dence to negate a mental element of an offense), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 710 (1988).
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If the diminished capacity defense is recognized in a jurisdiction, courts still
must decide whether expert testimony offered for the defense is admissible under
governing evidence law. Scientific evidence was first identified as deserving extra
scrutiny in Frye v. United States150 where the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a scientific principle could not
have probative value unless it had gained "gefieral acceptance" in the field to
which it pertained.151 In the sixty-six years since Frye was decided, courts have
retreated from this standard.152 The court in United States v. Brawner warned
that introducing such testimony "requires careful administration by the trial
judge" by means of a proffer outside the jury's presence and a determination by
the judge "whether the testimony is grounded in sufficient scientific support to
warrant use in the courtroom, and whether it would aid the jury in reaching a
decision on the ultimate issues."153 Courts and scholars continue to debate evi-
dence problems inherent in the diminished capacity defense.' 54 At least one
court following the Brawner standard of "sufficient scientific support"' 55 re-
jected psychiatric testimony that did not meet that test.' 5 6 Commentators have
suggested prohibiting psychiatric testimony on the ultimate issue of intent, 17 or
allowing only relatively simple psychiatric testimony that is clearly probative of
a mens rea element and that jurors can understand easily,158 or allowing less
than exact evidence that is relevant to the definition of mens rea provided by the
criminal statute. 59
The Federal Rules of Evidence and the North Carolina Rules of Evidence
150. 293"F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
151. Id. at 1014.
152. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203 (3d ed. 1984).
153. 471 F.2d 969, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
154. See, eg., Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1979); E. CLEARY, supra note 152,
§ 203 (discussing standards for introduction of scientific evidence); Note, Legal and Psychiatric Con.
cepts and the Use of Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 411 (1985).
155. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 1002.
156. United States v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1975). The Bright court upheld the exclusion
of a psychiatrist's testimony that defendant's "passive-dependent personality disorder" prevented
her from believing that stolen checks given to her by her boyfriend were actually stolen. Id. at 586
(quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)). The court made a common
sense observation:
[t]o transmute the effect of... the host of attitudes and syndromes that are a part of daily
living, into opinion evidence to the jury for exculpation or condemnation is to go beyond
the boundaries of current knowledge. The shallower the conception the deeper runs the
danger that the jury may be misled.
Id.
157. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 68, at 456 (ultimate issue is a moral judgment beyond
clinical expertise); Morse, supra note 68, at 48-50 (conclusion about mens rea is not a scientific
process but a common-sense inference that would be unduly influenced by a psychiatrist's conclusion
or diagnosis).
158. Lewin, supra note 67, at 1095-97; Note, supra note 154, at 441-42; Comment, supra note 93,
at 237 (testimony should be excluded when psychiatrists are "unable to match their evaluation of a
defendant's mental condition to the culpable mental states defined by the law").
159. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 68, at 446 ("If the law chooses to define culpability in subjec-
tive terms, it cannot close the door ontbe defendant's effort to reconstruct his actual state of




each allow the introduction of relevant expert testimony1 60 as long as such evi-
dence "will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue."' 6 1 The expert's testimony generally must be based on facts "rea-
sonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." 162
The North Carolina rules differ from the federal rules, however, by al-
lowing otherwise admissible expert testimony to be introduced even if it em-
braces an ultimate issue of a criminal defendant's mental state. 163 North
Carolina Rule 704 supersedes earlier cases in the state prohibiting expert opinion
about a defendant's mental ability to commit a crime.164 But as demonstrated
by recent North Carolina Supreme Court decisions, including State v. Rose 165
and State v. Weeks, 166 other evidence rules will render inadmissible expert con-
clusions that simply parrot legal standards without any scientific basis. 167 In
State v. Rose the supreme court held that although expert testimony that defend-
ant could not form a specific intent to kill was admissible, testimony from the
same expert that defendant could not premeditate or deliberate at the time of the
killings was properly excluded at trial.168 The court, referring to State v. Weeks
and earlier decisions as authority, explained that the terms "premeditation" and
"deliberation" were legal terms of art whose meanings were not readily apparent
to a medical expert. 169 In State v. Weeks the court was presented with a defend-
ant who was convicted of first-degree felony murder and second-degree murder
after attempting to assert both the insanity defense and the diminished capacity
defense.1 70 Defendant denied that he had acted with malice, an element of each
offense.' 7 1 Defendant challenged the trial court's exclusion of a psychologist's
testimony that defendant at the time of the killings was not "in a cool state of
160. FED. R. EVID. 401; N.C. R. EvID. 401.
161. FED. R. EvID. 702; N.C. R. EvID. 702.
162. FED. R. EvID. 703; N.C. R. EVID. 703.
163. N.C. R. EVID. 704. The rule is identical to the first half of the correlating federal rule. But
it does not include a corollary to Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b):
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in
a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did
not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of
the defense thereto.
FED. R. EVID. 704(b) (amended by Pub. L. 98473, Title II, § 406, 98 Stat. 2067 (1984)).
164. See cases cited in H. BRANDIS, supra note 64, § 127.
165. 323 N.C. 455, 373 S.E.2d 426 (1988).
166. 322 N.C. 152, 367 S.E.2d 895 (1988).
167. Id. at 164-66, 367 S.E.2d at 903 (citing N.C. R. EvID. 702); State v. Ledford, 315 N.C. 599,
617, 340 S.E.2d 309, 321 (1986) (citing N.C. R. EVID. 702 and finding error in pathologist's testi-
mony that injuries were "proximate cause" of death); Murrow v. Daniels, 85 N.C. App. 401, 408,
355 S.E.2d 204, 210 (1987) (expert cannot draw conclusion that lack of security was "gross negli-
gence"), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 321 N.C. 494, 364 S.E.2d 392 (1988).
168. Rose, 323 N.C. at 457-60, 373 S.E.2d at 429.
169. Id.
170. Weeks, 322 N.C at 157, 367 S.E.2d at 898. The defendant was charged with two counts of
first-degree murder in the shooting and burning deaths of his father and stepmother. He was found
guilty of second degree murder in the death of his father and guilty of first-degree felony murder in
the death of his stepmother, the underlying felony being the other murder. Id.
171. Malice is an essential element of common-law murder, codified in North Carolina as second
degree murder. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1987). Common-law murder committed during the
commission of another felony is first degree felony murder. Id.
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mind, that he was acting under a suddenly aroused violent passion, that he did
not act with deliberation, and that as a result of his mental disorder his ability to
conform his behavior to the requirements of the law was impaired."' 172 The
supreme court affirmed the exclusion, ruling that the evidence was "expert testi-
mony embracing a legal conclusion that the expert is not qualified to make.', t 73
In reaching this conclusion, the court cited rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules
of Evidence which allows an expert to testify only about what the expert actually
understands. 174
The difference between the decision in State v. Shank and those in Weeks
and Rose is attributable to North Carolina Rule 702. Expert testimony about
legal conclusions that the expert himself does not understand cannot possibly
help the jury do its job.175 The exclusion of such testimony does not necessarily
mean that an expert witness cannot explain his understanding of legal standards
or approximate the legal standards with similar terms that he does understand,
as did the expert whose testimony was ruled admissible in Shank.' 76 The
supreme court ruled that the expert in Shank could testify that "in his opinion,
defendant's diminished mental capacity affected his ability to make and carry
out plans" 177 as support for defendant's contention that he did not premeditate
and deliberate.' 78 That such testimony by an expert is probative of the legal
terms would be clear to a jury, especially if the jury were instructed to consider
evidence of mental condition when determining the intent issue.
A more slippery evidentiary basis for excluding evidence to support the
diminished capacity defense is relevancy. Under both the Federal Rules and
North Carolina Rules of Evidence, evidence must be relevant to be admissi-
ble.179 Judges differ in their opinions of which evidence is logically related to
elements of a criminal offense.' 80
172. Weeks, 322 N.C. at 166, 367 S.E.2d at 903. A "cool state of mind" describes deliberation,
and for malice to exist, "suddenly aroused violent passion" must be absent. NORTH CAROLINA
PATrERN JURY INSTRUcTIONS, Crim. § 206.10 (1987).
. 173. Weeks, 322 N.C. at 164-67, 367 S.E.2d at 902-04. The proffered testimony, the court ruled,
"embraces precise legal terms, definitions of which are not readily apparent to medical experts." Id.
at 166, 367 S.E.2d at 904.
174. Id. at 164, 367 S.E.2d at 904; see N.C. R. EVID. 702. The court's decision found some
support in the trial record of the expert's testimony that the proffered legal terms "come a little hard
to psychologists and psychiatrists." Weeks, 322 N.C. at 166 n.2, 367 S.E.2d at 904 n.2. The court
also cited two decisions, handed down after rule 702 became state law in 1986, in support of its
ruling. Id. at 164-65, 367 S.E.2d at 903-04 (citing State v. Ledford, 315 N.C. 599, 340 S.E.2d 309
(1986) and Murrow v. Daniels, 85 N.C. App. 401, 355 S.E.2d 204 (1987), rev'd and remanded on
other grounds, 321 N.C. 494, 364 S.E.2d 392 (1988)).
Because it held that the evidence was inadmissible under the evidence rules, the Weeks court did
not need to evaluate the diminished capacity defense. See State v. Clark, No. 27A88 (N.C. March 2,
1989) (LEXIS, States library, N.C. file).
175. See State v. Clark, - N.C. -, 377 S.E.2d 54 (1989).
176. See 322 N.C. at 246, 367 S.E.2d at 641-42.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. FED. R. EvID. 401; N.C. R. EvID. 401. These rules define relevant evidence as "evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Id.
180. For one court's fine distinctions between relevant and irrelevant mens rea elements, see
United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 905-06 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 710 (1988).
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By requiring the admission of competent evidence supporting the dimin-
ished capacity defense, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Shank has en-
forced the sixth amendment 1 81 requirement that defendants be allowed to
present evidence in their defense. 182 By applying the rule of Shank to cases in
which the defendant asserts an insanity defense as well as cases in which the
defendant does not, the supreme court in Rose corrected the threat to due pro-
cess created in Cooper,183 albeit sub silentio. In doing so the court enforced the
fourteenth amendment requirement that to convict the defendant the prosecu-
tion must prove each offense element beyond a reasonable doubt.' 84 The
formula established in Cooper, that a jury's rejection of the insanity defense nec-
essarily means defendant had the capacity to premeditate and deliberate, 185
amounted to a de facto presumption. 186 That this formula appears unsupported
by scientific or legal authority was only half of its shortcoming. 187 By creating a
presumption based not on any fact that the state proved, but rather on the de-
fendant's failure to prove an affirmative defense, the Cooper court relieved the
state of its duty to prove each offense element beyond a reasonable doubt.1 88
Shank and Rose take a careful step forward for North Carolina. These
decisions mean that competent expert testimony relevant to specific intent ele-
ments of first degree murder may be introduced to challenge the prosecution on
its burden of proof, and that juries should be instructed to consider such evi-
dence for that purpose.' 8 9
One important issue that neither Shank nor Rose explicitly addressed is
what burden of production a defendant must meet to require the court to submit
the diminished capacity defense to the jury. In Rose the supreme court required
181. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State,... [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
182. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,
19 (1967).
183. Rose, 323 N.C. at 457-58, 372 S.E.2d at 429; see Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 213 S.E.2d 305
(1975); supra text accompanying notes 95-106.
184. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
185. See supra text accompanying note 92.
186. Through presumptions, the existence of one fact is presumed from proof of an-
other.... The 'true' presumption creates an inference that is mandatory unless rebutted
.... Although some penal statutes purport to create presumptions in mandatory terms,
they are generally not given compulsory effect. Instead, the term 'presumption' is used in
the criminal law to describe what might better be termed a permissible inference.
Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 64, at 1335-36 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 1387-93 (constitu-
tional import of presumptions).
187. H. BRANDIS, supra note 64, § 234 (permissive presumption of intent may arise if a rational
connection exists between facts found and existence of intent); Comment, supra note 93, at 230; see
also State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 647, 220 S.E.2d 575, 586 (1975) (presumption of premedita-
tion and deliberation not allowed under North Carolina precedents), rev'd on other grounds, 432 U.S.
233 (1977).
188. The due process problem is discussed at supra note 93 and notes 120-26 and accompanying
text.
189. Although Shank did not expressly rule that jury instructions are required, Shank expressly
overruled two cases that upheld denial of jury instructions for diminished capacity based on Cooper.
Shank, 322 N.C. at 251, 367 S.E.2d at 644 (overruling State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d
144 (1983) and State v. Anderson, 303 N.C. 185, 278 S.E.2d 238 (1981)).
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a jury instruction on: diminished capacity based on a psychiatrist's testimony
that defendant "could not have formed the specific intent to kill" his victims.190
The court did not discuss whether less certain testimonial or circumstancial evi-
dence would meet defendant's burden.19 1 As a matter of public policy, the bur-
den should be lower than that for the intoxication defense because mental
impairment is an immutable defect not voluntarily incurred by the defendant.t 92
If no evidence of mens rea is presented, the prosecution has a procedural advan-
tage in North Carolina, because jurors are instructed that intent to kill, premedi-
tation and deliberation may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. 193
Although a permissible inference favors the prosecution only slightly in compar-
ison to a presumption, it often delivers a prima facie case for the state on mens
rea elements. Fairness may require that a trial judge who allows jurors to infer
the existence of mental elements of a crime based on circumstantial evidence
also instruct jurors that they may infer the nonexistence of those elements based
on circumstantial evidence. If such evidence were sufficient to obtain a jury
instruction on the diminished capacity defense, defense witnesses would not be
forced to walk the fine line between qualified expert opinion and unqualified
legal conclusion.
Other issues also remain unresolved. North Carolina courts must decide
whether evidence of diminished capacity will be allowed to negate mens rea ele-
ments of offenses other than murder. The battle over what evidence is relevant,
competent, and helpful to a jury will no doubt continue.
Issues surrounding the diminished capacity defense should be carefully
scrutinized in capital murder cases, which the United States Supreme Court has
recognized require the greatest procedural care.' 94 The Supreme Court's deci-
190. Rose, 323 N.C. at 457, 373 S.E.2d at 427. The court in Shank did not reach the jury
instruction issue.
191. One United States Court of Appeals judge, in a concurring opinion, has defined the burden
for raising negating defenses as "the ultimately modest one of merely producing 'some' evidence"
when the absence of a defense will result in a presumption against the defendant. Davis v. All-
sbrooks, 778 F.2d 168, 182 (4th Cir. 1985) (Phillips, J., concurring).
192. In a decision handed down after this Note was written, the North Carolina Supreme Court
adopted a lower burden of production for the diminished capacity defense. State v. Clark, - N.C.
-, 377 S.E.2d 54 (1989). The court held:
The proper test is whether the evidence of defendant's mental condition is sufficient to
cause a reasonable doubt in the mind of a rational trier of fact as to whether the defendant
was capable of forming the specific intent to kill the victim at the time of the killing.
Id. The court explained that "where the defendant's mental defect was beyond his or her control,
the policy reasons for posing the high, 'utterly incapable' standard of voluntary intoxication cases do
not apply." Id. For a discussion of the intoxication defense see supra notes 78-80 and accompanying
text. The burden of production issue was addressed recently by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
State v. Breakiron, 108 N.J. 591, 532 A.2d 199 (1987). The court held that requiring a defendant to
show a preponderance of evidence to raise the diminished capacity defense did not violate due pro-
cess, because the existence of a mental defect was not an element of the offense charged. Id. at 620-
21, 532 A.2d at 214. The Breakiron decision is discussed in Comment, Constitutional Law-Due
Process-Criminal Defendant Must Prove He Suffered From Mental Disease or Defect by Preponder-
ance of Evidence Before He May Introduce Such Evidence to Negate The Existence of an Element of
the Offense. State v. Breakiron, 108 N.J. 591, 532,A.2d 199 (1987), 19 RUTGERS L.J. 1101 (1988).
193. NORTH CAROLINA PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Crim. § 206.10 (1987), discussed supra
at notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
194. "This Court has always insisted that the need for procedural safeguards is particularly great
where a life is at stake." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 913 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
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sions prohibiting a shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant on elements
of crime195 require that all defendants charged with first degree murder be af-
forded every opportunity to negate the prosecution's proof with evidence of
mental impairment.
LUCY NOBLE INMAN
(citations omitted). "[How much more should we guard against a fatal mishap where life is at
stake." Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 488 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
195. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684j 704 (1975) (cannot make defendant prove he acted in the
heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to reduce homicide to manslaughter); cf. Martin v.
Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987) (can put burden of proof on defendant to show an affirmative defense
because this is not an element of the crime); see also supra note 116 (discussing the reasoning in
Martin).
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